This paper presents a descriptive model that highlights the essence of what pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) do in managing certain formulary choices made by their clients. These choices are affected by market share rebates offered by drug manufacturers. We have found that a model based on simple game theory provides key insights into the behavior of PBMs.
Introduction
Almost all private health care insurance plans today rely on third-party contractors called pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to manage the prescription (Rx) drug benefits portion of the plan. Arguments for and against extending Medicare to cover outpatient Rx drugs costs sooner or later will come around to PBMs. What do they do? Do they act as fiduciaries when they manage the drug portion of health care benefit plans? Or are they service providers with no 
By framing the description as an abstract model, we pinpoint exactly what PBMs do to make
MSRs work. The model demonstrates that PBMs and MSRs are inextricably related. We will show that PBMs behave as good dual agents for both plan sponsors and drug manufacturers when they translate MSR schedules into marginal costs schedules. Indeed, we think that they explain to clients the pitfalls of making uncoordinated formulary choices based on average MSR schedules put forth by drug manufacturers. Without PBMs to manage formulary choices, plan sponsors and drug manufacturers would be facing a game-like "prisoner's dilemma" situation Formalizing exactly how PBMs behave can be useful in examining complex legal and accounting questions that turn on characterizations of behavior. For example, the applicability of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) turns on whether a company is characterized as a fiduciary or as a service provider. It is behavior that seems to distinguish a fiduciary from a service provider. Fiduciaries make discretionary decisions in the administration of a health care benefits plan. Service providers do not. PBMs claim that they are service providers because all discretionary decisions in the administration of the formulary are left to the plan sponsor. Our model of PBM behavior may be useful in examining this question.
Another question has to do with how PBMs account for rebates from drug manufacturers. PBMs' auditors have made a determination that allows them to account for rebates on a "net basis" versus a "gross basis". This determination is very advantageous to PBMs because it allows them to mask their rebate-retention rate-the share of gross rebates received from drug manufacturers that they retain. Disclosure would offer clients a benchmark that could be used to negotiate more favorable contracts with PBMs. This accounting issue turns on whether a PBM is classified as principal or an agent. Accountants have developed a hodge-podge list of behavioral, contractual, and financial characteristics. But there is a common thread running through all of these.
Principals are risk takers and act independently. Agents do not take risks and only act in the best interest of their clients. Our model may be useful in determining whether PBMs act as principals or as agents when they manage certain formulary choices for their clients. therapeutically equivalent patented drugs of similar costs. The cost-savings are strictly in terms of MSRs received. While MSRs come into play in only a relatively small number of therapeutic classes, the competition is usually between "blockbuster" drugs manufactured by some of the biggest names in pharmaceuticals. There is another important aspect to formulary choice that seems behavioral that we do not deal with here. It is the rebate-retention rate ---the share of gross rebates received by PBMs that is retained and not passed on to plan sponsors. This is the reward to PBMs for their management efforts. In our opinion, the specific rate is a reward for certain behavior, but it is not behavior itself.
Market Share Rebates
The pay-off in the formulary game is MSRs. Rebates from drug manufacturers to PBMs generally fall into two categories: (1) volume or access fees, and (2) We think that a manufacturer starts out by asking what is it willing to pay for, say a 1%, increase in sales for a particular drug it manufacturers. The most a manufacturer is willing to pay is the "contribution margin" of revenue minus variable costs of sale minus some target pre-tax earning rate. Using figures from the latest quarterly financial statement of one of the large patented drug manufacturers, Pfizer, we can translate this formula into specific numbers. 2 Pfizer reported the following rates and margins: cost of good sold (COG) of 15% (with a complementary gross profit margin of 85%); sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) of 49%; and earning before interest and taxes (EBIT) of 36%. Assuming COG is the sum of a variable cost of sale of 5% and a fixed cost production rate of 15%, then the contribution margin would be 95% and the willingness-topay, or contribution margin less EBIT, would be 95% minus 36% = 59%. The rebate that this manufacturer would be willing to pay for 1% increase in sales would be 1% times (95% minus 36%) = .59%.
What remains to be done is to translate market share swings delivered by a PBM into rates of increase in the manufacturer's sales. This requires the manufacturer to set some baseline distribution of sales between the manufacturer's drug and its competitors. Assume for example that the baseline share for a particular PBM is set at 50 / 50. That 50-share represents 20% of the total sales of the manufacturer's drug. Managing a 10 point swing to 60 / 40 would result in a 2% increase in the manufacturer's sales and would be rewarded with a rebate equal to 2% * .59%
of the manufacturers sales. This is equivalent to 10% * .59% = 5.9% of the sales controlled by the PBM. In general, the PBM rebate rate as a function of swing is = (swing) * (contribution margin -EBIT). Thus a 10-point swing is rewarded by a 5.9% rebate; a 20-point swing is rewarded by an 11.8% rebate; a 30-point swing is rewarded by a 17.7% rebate; etc.
Brand name drug manufacturers offer MSRs only when their product faces competitive alternatives. This condition is present in a small number of therapeutic classes. When the competition is present, it is between "blockbuster" drugs whose sales are significant contributors to the profitability of the biggest names in pharmaceuticals. Drugs can be classified as facing one of three possible competitive situations:
(1) A single patented drug with no therapeutic equivalents (no substitution);
(2) The set of patented and off-patented drugs facing competition from other drugs that are therapeutic equivalents (close substitution); (3) The set of generic drugs (perfect substitutes).
A Congressional Budget Office study has estimated the distribution of retail pharmacy sales in 1994 by competitive situation. 3 The study found that 55.5% of all retail pharmacy sales represented single source patented drugs with no therapeutic equivalents; 27.2% represented therapeutic equivalents with close substitutes, and the remaining 17.3% represented generics.
Brand drug manufacturers pay volume rebates for all drugs in class (1) and class (2) . This means that volume rebates are paid on 82.7% of the retail Rx drugs sales covered by health care plans.
There is no reason for MSRs to be paid in case (1) because there is no competition. In case (3), generic drug manufactures historically have negotiated rebates with chain drugstores and buyer co-ops because substitutability comes into play in purchasing choices at the wholesale level and not in choosing the design of a formulary. MSRs are paid only for patented drugs in case (2).
Assuming a 50 / 50 division between patented and off-patented drugs in case (2), this means that MSR are estimated to be paid on only 13.6% of Rx drug spending covered by third-party plans.
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Formulary Choice
The formulary is a look-up table that PBMs have added to point-of-sale claims processing systems. It checks a prescription request against a list of therapeutic equivalents preferred by the plan sponsor. The formulary can flag a pharmacist to request that a generic drug be substituted for a higher priced off-patented brand name drug. A formulary also can flag a pharmacist to call a prescribing physician to seek approval for the substitution of one brand name drug for another in the same therapeutic class.
There is a two-step process a drug must go through before it is listed in the formulary ---an its formulary to both drugs rather than standardize on one can result in 1% lower MSR rate a PBM is due to receive. In order to make individual clients "act responsibly", the computer model assigns the entire loss of $3M to $10M to the individual client. One can imagine the reaction of a client when it sees the laptop screen flash a $10M loss in MSR as a consequence of opening up a therapeutic class to both drugs rather than standardizing on one.
The Formulary Game
The following model derived from game theory formalizes the discussion presented above. It demonstrates the essential nature of interdependencies of formulary choices created by MSRs.
Rather than being totally abstract, we use the names of two patented, but therapeutically equivalent, drugs that are involved in a major battle for market share. This is the intense fight between Pfizer's Lipitor and Merck's Zocor in the cholesterol-reducing therapeutic class. Their market share is 42% and 32%, respectively, of an $18.8 Billion dollars market. Table 1 below: Based on this schedule, we derive a pay-off matrix in Table 3 : What would be the best strategy for plan sponsors if they made choices in isolation based on the average rebate schedules provided by both drug manufacturers? In this case, choosing an open formulary over any of the two closed formularies would be the "dominant strategy" in that it is a player's best choice -in terms of payoff and breadth of offering --in response to any choice the other player might make. Choosing open formularies is equivalent to the (confess, confess) strategy in the prisoner's dilemma game.
MSRs only work to "move markets" if PBMs exercise some discretion in managing formulary choice. They do this by initializing the process with a standardized formulary of their own choosing. In a few key therapeutic classes where there are intense battles between patented drugs, it is the PBM that chooses initially what drug is preferred. Individual plan sponsors are then free to deviate from the standard and customize, but they are subject to the marginal consequences of their act-the loss in rebates to themselves and all other clients managed by the PBMs.
The second crucial act performed by PBMs when they manage formulary choices affected by MSRs is to translate the average rebate schedules of drug manufacturers into rebate schedules projecting the marginal costs and benefits from customization. Table 4 below is a translation of the average rebate schedule presented earlier in our example. The example indicates the severe penalty a plan sponsor can face if it deviates from the standard in a key therapeutic class. But, it is in a plan sponsor's best interest to be made fully responsible for the consequences of customization. It is best for plan sponsors to base their formulary choices on the marginal rebate schedules of PBMs instead of average rebate schedules of drug manufacturers.
Our model highlights the essence of what PBMs do in managing formulary choices affected by
MSRs. Their act of initializing formulary choice with a national formulary of their own design is an
